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Damages Versus Specific Performance:
Lessons from Commercial Contracts
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller*

Specific performance is a central contractual remedy but, in Anglo-American law, generally
is subordinate to damages. Despite rich theoretical discussions of specific performance, little
is known about parties' treatment of the remedy in their contracts. We study 2,347 contracts
of public corporations to quantify the presence or absence of specific performance clauses
in several types of contracts. Although a majority of contracts do not refer to specific
performance, substantial variation exists in the rates of including specific performance
clauses. High rates of specific performance use in the area of corporate combinations
through merger (53.4 percent) or assets sales (45.1 percent), inclusion of specific performance in some contracts of every type, and much lower use of it in loan agreements suggest
that treatment of specific performance in sophisticated corporate contracts is more complex
than existing theories of contractual remedies allow. Theories should expressly account for
contract type variation. We also present results on the associations among contractual
acceptance of five default dispute resolution rules: specific performance clauses, arbitration
clausesjury trial waiver clauses, litigation forum clauses, and attorney fee clauses. Rejecting
the default damages rule in favor of specific performance is associated with rejecting each of
the four other dispute resolution clauses.

1. INTRODUCTION
Black-letter law holds that an injunction-specific performance-is available in an action
for breach of contract only in cases where damages are inadequate.' This rule has a hoary
lineage, with antecedents in the early common law of England.2 It is endorsed by courts

* The late Theodore Eisenberg was Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Science
Cornell University. Miller is Stuyvesant P. Comfort Professor of Law, New York University. Miller can be contacted at
geoffrey.miller@nyu.edu.
We thank Natalie Erbe, Felicity S. KohnJeremy Masys, Sergio Muro, Hillel Pohulanik, Whitney Schwab, Peter Van
Valkenburgh, and Cathy Weist for valuable research assistance.
'See, e.g., Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910) ("a suit for damages would have given adequate
relief, and therefore the appellee should have been confined to its remedy at law"); William Bishop, The Choice of
Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14J. Legal Stud. 299 (1985); Lewis Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic
Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683 (1986); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 351 (1978).
2See MichaelJ. Sechler, Supply Versus Demand for Efficient Legal Rules: Evidence from Early English "Contract" Law
and the Rise of Assumpsit, 73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 161 (2011).
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throughout the United States and elsewhere in the English-speaking world. The subordination of specific performance is firmly embedded in the jurisprudence of contract law,
and generally accepted in the courts.
Yet the rule preferring damages over specific performance is also mysterious. Its
intellectual underpinnings are far from clear-as evidenced by a vigorous debate among
contract theorists regarding the utility of the rule.' The black-letter law of many countries
with modern systems of contract law does not prefer damages over specific performance.'
Even in the United States, long a citadel of support for the rule, the foundations appear to
be eroding; courts do not always adhere rigidly to the rule,' and some have argued that the
measure of damages actually awarded is closer to the breaching party's profit from breach
than to the nonbreaching party's lost profits-a measure that emulates, in some respects,
the supposedly disfavored specific performance remedy.'
This article studies the rule on specific performance from a different perspective than
those employed previously. Instead of theorizing about the rule, we examine the actual
behavior of contracting parties.' Specifically, we analyze a data set of 2,347 contracts filed as
exhibits with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in connection with reports of
material events by reporting companies on Form 8-K, the "current report" form companies
must file with the SEC to announce major events of which shareholders should be aware.

'See Richard Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1349, 1361 (2008) (endorsing the
traditional rule but recognizing that the arguments for and against the rule are "not conclusive"); see also sources
cited in notes 14-43 infra.
'See Gerard De Vries, Right to Specific Performance: Is There a Divergence Between Civil- and Common-Law Systems
and, If So, How Has it Been Bridged in the DCFR? 17 Eur. Rev. Private L. 581 (2009); RonaldJ. Scalise Jr., Why No
"Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55
Am.J. Comp. L. 721, 726-33 (2007); Henrik Lando & Caspar Rose, On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in
Civil Law Countries, 24 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 473 (2004); John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and
Germany, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 495, 496 (1958). However, the differences between civil- and common-law systems are not
always as clear-cut as might at first appear. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
'See notes 32-43 and accompanying text infra.
'See Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A Disgorgement Theory of Contract
Remedies, 52 William & Mary L. Rev. 1181, 1184 (2011).
'We have developed this approach to legal theory-that is, examining the actual behavior of sophisticated contracting
parties whose incentives ex ante are to maximize thejoint value of the undertaking-in several prior papers dealing
with other issues of contractual dispute resolution. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English vs. the
American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 327 (2013);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice
of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1475 (2009); Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration for Customers But Not for Peers, 92 Judicature 118
(2009); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 871 (2008); Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an Empirical Study ofJury Trial Waiver Clauses
in Large Corporate Contracts, 4J. Empirical Legal Stud. 539 (2007); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex AnteArbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 56
DePaul L. Rev. 335 (2007); Theodore Eisenberg &Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1975 (2006).
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This data set offers the advantage that it contains important contracts entered into by
sophisticated economic actors whose incentives are to agree to rules that generate joint
value for the transaction. Because of these features, there is reason to believe that the
contract terms observed in this data set reflect efficient solutions to the contracting
problem.
We examine the contracts in this data set to identify and analyze efforts by the
counterparties to contract around the traditional rule preferring damages over specific
performance.' If nothing is said in the contract about this issue, the ordinary background
rule of contract law will apply, but the parties can attempt to avoid the application of this
rule by including language that seeks to influence how a court will treat the choice
among contract remedies-for example, by stipulating that damages are not an adequate
remedy for breach and agreeing that specific performance is appropriate. Although it is
not clear that this language will be binding on the courts-the parties' ex ante agreement on this point will surely have an influence, perhaps a decisive influence, on how a
court rules in an actual dispute.'o Thus, clauses providing for specific performance have
the potential to cause a court that would otherwise award damages to award specific
performance instead.
Our reason for studying these clauses is that sophisticated parties' contractual silence
concerning specific performance suggests that they do not have strong objections to
damages as the preferred remedy in the event of breach-and have adjusted other contract
terms (such as price) to account for the relative impacts of a damages regime on their
expected payoffs from the deal." Parties concerned about contractual silence's negative
inference concerning the availability of specific performance can expressly negate the
inference. For example, an asset sale agreement states that conditions. authorizing termination of an agreement shall not be deemed "to impair the right of any party to compel
2
specific performance by another party of its obligations under this Agreement."'

'On contracting around background remedies for breach of contract, see Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees
Prefer Supercompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369, 387-89
(1990).
'Compare Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 324 Wis.2d 703, 724, 783 N.W.2d 294, 303 (Wis. 2010) ("when
a contract specifies remedies available for breach of contract, the intention of the parties generally governs") with
Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 64 (Ala. 1955) (parties cannot determine the availability of equitable relief on their
own).
"See Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 64 (Ala. 1955) ("the provision for an injunction is important in its influence upon
an exercise of the discretionary power of the court to grant a temporary injunction").
"See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97
Va. L. Rev. 1939 (2011) (suggesting that sophisticated parties who enter a contract under the traditional rule are
aware that they are buying or selling an option to perform or pay damages); Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The
Expectation Remedy and the Promissory Basis of Contract: Symposium in Honor of the 30th Anniversary of the

Publication of Contract as Promise, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 799, 808 (2012).
'2Asset Purchase Agreement dated as of Oct. 17, 2001 between Imation and KPG § 10.02(c).
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The inference of the acceptability of damages, of course, is not true by necessity;
possibly the observed behavior of contracting parties on the question of remedies reflects
inattention, complacency, or a simple lack of imagination. However, given the sophistication of the parties in our data set, the importance of the contracts involved, and the fact that
many of these contracts contain other clauses governing disputes under the contract, it is
plausible to suppose that the parties' silence on the matter of contract remedies usually is
meaningful. When, on the other hand, the parties have attempted to opt out of damages
relief and into the specific performance remedy, it can be inferred that their judgment is
that the value of the contract ex ante will be maximized if the courts will award specific
performance in the event of breach rather than awarding contract damages. Thus, it is
useful to study cases where parties have specifically expressed a preference for specific
performance as a remedy, since we can infer from their behavior that they believe that
specific performance is the remedy that maximizes joint profits ex ante. This article
performs such a study.
In brief, our study supports the inference that sophisticated contracting parties often
do prefer specific performance to contract damages and they prefer it a majority of the time
in contracts involving corporate combinations. Thus, while a majority of contracts, 68.5
percent, 3 do not refer to specific performance, substantial variation exists in the rates of
including specific performance clauses. High rates of specific performance use in the area
of corporate combinations through merger (53.4 percent) or assets sales (45.1 percent),
inclusion of specific performance in some contracts of every type, and much lower use of it
in loan agreements suggest that theories of contractual remedy should expressly account
for contract type variation. Analysis of other variables reveals that specific performance is
not strongly correlated with the presence of a non-U.S. party to a contract and is associated
with relational contracts (but this result is sensitive to specific types). Inclusion of specific
performance clauses is significantly associated with the presence of other contract terms
departing from default dispute resolution clause treatment.
This article is structured as follows. Section II sets forth the traditional rule and
explores the arguments for and against its efficiency as compared with specific performance. Section III outlines the prior empirical literature. Section IV describes the data set
and sets forth the hypotheses we test. Section V analyzes the results and Section VI concludes.

II.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

A. The TraditionalRule

As noted, the traditional common-law rule is that specific performance is available only
when damages are inadequate. The rule is an instance of the more general principle that

"This falls to 53.6 percent if one regards underwriting contracts that effectively, but not expressly, provide for specific
performance as preferring specific performance. See text accompanying notes 77-79, 95 infra.

Damages Versus Specific Performance

33

equitable relief-specific performance being an equitable remedy"'-is awarded only when
the legal remedy is inadequate.'
This leaves open the question of when damages are "inadequate." This condition
occurs when damages are difficult to quantify-for example, during the sale of a business
with no ready market value," or when the breach would prevent the nonbreaching party
from performing a contract with a third party-as when the nonbreaching party is under a
contractual obligation to resell the specific property in question." Damages can also be
inadequate when the plaintiff has a particular use for the property that cannot be fully
compensated by a damage award based on market value.'" Courts may in their discretion
conclude that damages are inadequate in other settings as well.
Despite its widespread adoption and hoary lineage, the traditional rule of AngloAmerican jurisprudence-a rule that we will sometimes refer to as the "damages" rule-is
today a controversial issue in contract theory. The next section sets out some of the leading
arguments for and against the traditional rule.
B. Arguments in Favor of the TraditionalRule

Several justifications can be imagined for the Anglo-American rule, at least as a default
principle that most contracting parties would prefer."
1. Damages, it is said, are generally a more efficient remedy because they permit
either party to engage in efficient breaches of contract-that is, to breach the
contract when the social value of breaching exceeds the social cost. If one party
will gain more from breaching than the other will lose from the breach, then
the first party can breach the contract and pay the second party damages equal to
the latter's lost profits. The first party is better off as a result of the breach and the
second is no worse off; society as a whole is a beneficiary. Specific performance, on

4
1 See, e.g., Lewis v. Premium Inv. Corp., 351 S.C. 167, 568 S.E.2d 361 (2002); Ellis v. Stanford, 256 Ga. App. 294, 568
S.E.2d 157 (2002); Schreck v. T & C Sanderson Farms, Inc., 37 P.3d 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); Webster v. Aust, 628
So. 2d 846 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); Sayer v. Bowley, 243 Neb. 801, 503 N.W.2d 166 (1993).
5
See Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials (4th ed. 2010) at 380 ("It is hornbook law
that equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at law.").
1

6
1

See, e.g., Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir.1993).

"'See, e.g., Texaco v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1984).
5
' See, e.g., Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J. Eq. 831, 66 A. 935 (Chancery 1907) (irreparable injury results from the
inability to procure at any price the goods necessary to assure the successful operation of a plant).

"For defenses of the traditional rule, see, e.g., Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, in SymposiumContract as Promise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 777, 784-85 (2012) (expectation
damages may bejustifiable as a default rule providing the remedy that most parties would prefer, and that, in a world
of costless and complete contracting, they would have explicitly chosen); Timothy Muris, The Costs of Freely Granting
Specific Performance, Duke L.J. 1053 (1982); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract,
82 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1982).
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the other hand, does not promote efficient breaches in the same way. Because
under specific performance the nonbreaching party can compel the breaching
party to perform its obligations under the contract, the social value of the breach
is lost.20 Settlement bargaining will overcome this problem if transactions costs are
low enough." The breaching party can pay the nonbreaching party some amount
larger than the breaching party's damages but lower than the breaching party's
profit from breach, leaving both parties better off and generating the socially
efficient allocation of resources. However, sometimes, costs of transactions-such
as strategic behavior of the parties, miscalculations, emotional factors, or simply a
lack of time to bargain-can prevent the parties from engaging in this sort of
value-enhancing deal." In such cases, society can be worse off under specific
performance than under damages.
2. The rule preferring damages over specific performance might limit the parties'
ability to extract unfair consideration during settlement negotiations. 23 Suppose
that the plaintiffs damages from breach are $500,000 but performing the contract
would cost the defendant $600,000. If it is presumed that the plaintiffs purpose in
entering the contract is only to obtain the profits expected from the defendant's
performance, rather than to also obtain extra profits after breach, then the
injunctive remedy would allow the plaintiff to obtain up to $100,000 in
unbargained-for compensation from the defendant as the price for settling the
suit. The rule limiting specific performance to cases where damages are inadequate polices against this sort of opportunism." At the same time, the rule may
also limit the defendant's ability to behave opportunistically in some settings.
Suppose that the contract is one for personal services. If the preferred remedy
were injunctive relief, then the defendant could satisfy its obligation by performing the services in question. However, since relations between the parties have
broken down at this point, the defendant can elect to shirk on performance in
order to reduce its costs of complying with the judgment. The Anglo-American
rule protects plaintiffs against this risk by preferring a monetary remedy-thus
20

See Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies: General, in 3 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 117, 125-26
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
"See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co.,799 F.2d 265, 279 (7th Cir. 1986).
22

See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain AfterJudgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 373, 381-83 (1999) (finding in a study of tort cases that the parties often failed to bargain for a monetary
settlement after the issuance of injunctive relief).
"See generally Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1999); Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
2'See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co.,799 F.2d 265, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Carbon County is
[probably] seeking specific performance in order to have bargaining leverage with NIPSCO, and we can think of no
reason why the law should give it such leverage"); Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d
Cir. 1974) (stating that an injunction prohibiting infringement "is not intended as a club to be wielded by a patentee
to enhance his negotiating stance").
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allowing the plaintiff to find another service provider to carry out the contract
obligations.
The rule could be seen to police against destructive behaviors by litigants who are
so emotionally involved in the litigation that they seek specific performance for
5
reasons of spite-not to benefit themselves, but rather to harm their adversaries.
The rule could be seen as enhancing the right to jury trial, since it establishes a
preference for damages (which trigger a right to jury trial) over injunctive relief
(generally adjudicated by the court).
The rule might conserve on judicial resources to the extent that the burden on
courts of ascertaining the correct measure of damages is lower than the burden of
policing the defendant's performance of the contract.
The rule might be justified as a tiebreaker: since some remedy must be awarded,
and it would not be appropriate to award both," courts need a principle for
deciding which one to award. The Anglo-American rule (in theory) partitions the
remedy into two mutually exclusive categories: cases where damages are adequate,
in which case money is the exclusive remedy; and cases where damages are not
adequate, in which case specific performance is the exclusive remedy.
The rule might be justified simply because it would be too disruptive to change it,
given that millions of contracts are written under the assumption that the rule will
7
govern their enforcement.
A preference for damages over specific performance might be justified from a
moral point of view. This argument must overcome the difficulty that damages
appear, from one point of view, to endorse the morally questionably act of breaking a promise. The damages remedy, however, could be conceived of not as an
option to breach a promise, but as an alternative form of performing a contractual
obligation; in this view, the morally problematic idea of the law rewarding people
for breaking promises disappears because no promise is broken. Backing this
interpretation is the idea that because people in contractual relationships implicitly promise to act in a way that maximizes their joint welfare, the law does not
unduly interfere with autonomy when it permits a party to an incomplete contract

2

See Brandon Grinsted, Comment, The Evolution of Court-Ordered Mergers: An Equitable Remedy or a Marriage
Made in Hell? 53 Mercer L. Rev. 1647, 1672 (2002); Jordan A. Goldstein, The Efficiency of Specific Performance in
Stock-for-Stock Mergers, 29 Delawarej. Corp. L. 747, 760 n.61 (2004).
"See Bronson v. La Crosse & Milwaukee R.R., 68 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1863); Price v. Franklin Inv. Co., 574 F.2d 594, 597
(D.C.Cir. 1978).
"See Posner, supra note 3, at 1361.

See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 Yale L.J. 568 (2006); CharlesJ. Goetz

&

2

Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and thejust Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement

Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 558 (1977); Markovits & Schwartz, The Myth of
&

Efficient Breach, supra note 11; Markovits & Schwartz, The Expectation Remedy, supra note 11; David Simon
Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A Challenge to the Enforceability of Market

Contracts, 92 Hary. L. Rev. 1395, 1436-37 (1979).
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to avoid performance by paying damages." Meanwhile, an order to pay damages
can be seen as less intrusive on the liberty of the breaching party than an order
requiring that party to perform the contract.so
C. Arguments Against the TraditionalRule

The foregoing arguments support the rule favoring contract damages over specific performance. On the other hand, other considerations suggest that specific performance ought
to be the favored remedy, or at least that the law ought to favor neither remedy," leaving
the nonbreaching party with the option about which to seek in a given case. These
arguments include the following.
1. Specific performance might be preferred if courts frequently make errors as to the
measure of contract damages." The rule favoring contract damages takes this
consideration into account, to a degree, by recognizing that uncertainty in the
estimation of damages is one reason to conclude that the damages remedy is
inadequate. But, in general, courts apply this exception in cases where damages
are obviously difficult or impossible to quantify-as in the case of the sale of a
small or new business with no market comparables." If, however, courts miscalculate contract damages in a wider range of cases, then specific performance may
generate more accurate outcomes from a social point of view.84 The problem is
particularly acute if courts err systematically in measuring damages, for example,
by excluding incidental damages.15 If the error bias is systematic, the result will

'See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 172-213 (2002); Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract
May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (2009).
"'See Brian Bix, Theories of Contract Law and Enforcing Promissory Morality: Comments on Charles Fried, in
Symposium-Contract as Promise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 719, 730 (2012).
"This was the view ofJustice Story. Melville M. Bigelow, 2 Commentaries on EquityJurisprudence as Administered in

England and America by Joseph Story § 717a (13th ed.); Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J. Eq. 831, 66 A. 935
(Chancery 1907) (citing Story).
32

See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466, 488-89 (1980). See also Eric
Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of RadicalJudicial Error I (U. Chi. Law School,John M. Olin
Law & Economics Working Paper No. 80), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1 73788> (arguing thatjudges are incapable of accurately assessing either liability or damages in contract cases).
"See, e.g., Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 112 A.2d 901 (Md. 1955) (loss of profits from a new business may
not be recovered because they are speculative).
'See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 1, at 300 (judicial underestimation of damages may generate inefficient levels of
breach).
"See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the
Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 975 (2005); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renego-

tiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629, 662 (1988); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 276 (1979).
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increase the frequency of inefficient breaches because parties who are deciding
whether to breach their promises anticipate that they will not have to pay full
compensatory damages if they do breach. Especially if the inefficiencies of holding
parties to inefficient terms are often corrected in settlement bargaining, the factor
of judicial error may favor specific performance over damages.
2. Specific performance may enhance efficiency to the extent that it respects and
enforces the ex ante agreement of the parties." If at the time of contract the
parties have superior information, or superior analytical skills, than courts can
bring to bear in ex post breach of contract litigation, then, all else equal, it could
3
be more efficient to require the parties to perform their obligations. 7
3. Specific performance may also enhance efficiency by assuring nonbreaching
parties ex post power to decide what remedy is preferable. This avoids the need to
expend time and effort to anticipate what the ex post situation may be at the time
of contracting. For example, an indenture contract may provide that, in the event
of default, the indenture trustee may enforce rights by any method the trustee
chooses "whether for the specific enforcement of any covenant or agreement in
this Indenture or in aid of the exercise of any power granted herein, or to enforce
any other proper remedy or legal or equitable right vested in the Indenture
Trustee by this Indenture or by law.""
4. Specific performance might be preferable from a moral point of view." If we
accept the ethical premise that people ought to keep their promises, then it would
seem that the law should hold the breaching party to his or her promise. The
nonbreaching party did not promise to pay the breaching party damages; he or
she promised to perform the contract as agreed. Thus, according to this argument, the courts ought to award specific performance as a matter of course, unless
good reasons are presented to prefer the damages remedy.40

"See Thomas S. Ulen, Specific Performance, in 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 481, 482 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract
Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984).
37

See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 291-92.

5

3 E.g., Master Indenture Between First Consumers Credit Card Master Note Trust, Issuer, and the Bank of New York,
Indenture Trustee, Dated as of Mar. 1, 2001, amended and restated as of Dec. 31, 2001, at 30.

&

"See, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 16 (1981); Randy E. Barnett,
Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. Phil. &Pol'y 179, 180, 183 (1986); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 13-14 (1989); Daniel Friedmann, Economic Aspects of Damages and Specific
Performance Compared, in Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 65 (Ralph Cunnington
Djakhongir Saidov eds., 2008); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the
Second Restatement, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 111, 138 (1981).
"oSee Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708, 722-23 (2007);Jody
S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1603 (2009); Andrew S. Gold, A Moral
Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 William & Mary L. Rev. 1873, 1924-25 (2011).
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5. Specific performance might be preferred on the ground that it rewards and
enforces the socially valuable investments that contracting parties make in their
relationship with one another. If people could casually walk away from contractual
commitments simply by paying money, they and their counterparties have less of
an incentive to invest in the relationship in the first place-much as Donald
Trump may find it easier to terminate a marriage when he has an iron-clad
prenuptial agreement in place that allows him to exit in exchange for some
specified monetary compensation.4 1
6. Specific performance might be preferred because it honors and encourages
norms of fidelity and trust in commercial settings. If one believes that these social
norms are inherently valuable, and believes further that the damages rule encourages the breakdown of these norms by validating the commoditization of commercial relationships, then specific performance might be preferred because it
honors and enhances norms of social solidarity."
7. Perhaps specific performance should be preferred because the preference for
damages favors sophisticated parties, who are better able to determine whether to
perform or breach and pay damages. If the law in general should avoid favoring
more sophisticated parties, then perhaps it should prefer specific performance to
damages when the contract is breached."

III.

PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Prior empirical literature on contract enforcement falls into two broad categories: comparative studies of contract enforcement across legal systems and experimental or
statistically-based studies of particular contracting issues.
A. Comparative Analysis

Although it was once conventional wisdom that civil-law systems endorse specific performance as the preferred remedy, or at least allow the nonbreaching party to select the
remedy," the trend of modern research is to downplay the differences between civil- and
common-law systems. When performance of pecuniary obligations is demanded, most

"See

Katz, supra note 19, at 792 (exploring but not endorsing the idea that "from an efficiency perspective, sacrificing
some degree of efficient reallocation of resources ex post could be economically worthwhile in order to achieve more
efficient investment incentives ex ante; this is a consequentialist reason for commitment that might lead some or even
most parties to prefer specific performance over expectation protection").
"See id. at 794-95 ("those who are committed to the virtues of solidarity and tnst, and concerned about their possible
decline in modern society, may have reason to object to establishing a default rule of pay-or-perform, and to oppose
a legal theory that promotes such a rule as socially desirable").

"See Gregory Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 Va. L. Rev. 143, 146 (2012).
"See, e.g., Charles Szladits, The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 Am.J. of Comp L. 208 (1955).
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civil-law courts will grant the specific performance remedy." The same, however, is effectively true in common-law countries, since in the case of pecuniary obligations an order to
perform the contract can be indistinguishable from an order to pay damages (if the
defendant has a legally proven past-due obligation to pay the plaintiff money, the courts in
both common-law and civil-law countries will order him or her to pay up). Even in the case
of nonpecuniary obligations, differences between civil- and common-law countries may be
smaller than at first appears. Even though civil-law systems endorse specific performance,
courts in some of these systems appear to administer rules in actual practice that are not
46
dramatically different than the rules applied in common-law systems. Some civil-law
countries purport to grant specific performance even if there are readily available substitutes for performance,4 7 although such relief may be granted only in limited circumstances.4 1 In other countries, however, courts may restrict the remedy of specific
4
Germany,"o
performance when a substitute for performance is available: Denmark,
5t
53
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Sweden, Italy," Denmark, and China are examples. In this latter group of countries,
the rules on contract enforcement converge substantially with those applicable in the
United States.

"See De Vries, supra note 4.
"Posner, supra note 3, at 1362-63 (courts "exercise discretion to award damages rather than order specific performance, and often the same outcomes are reached in common law and civil law systems under different doctrinal
rubrics"); Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future International Commercial Code, 65 La.
L. Rev. 677, 751-52 (2005);John Y. Gotanda, Recovering Lost Profits in International Disputes, 36 GeorgetownJ. Int'l

L. 61, 63-64 (2004);Jtilian Hermida, Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law in the Criminal Theory Realm, 13
U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 163, 167-70 (2005); Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains are High and
the Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 Am. Bus. L.J. 459, 475 (2003).
4

France and Switzerland are examples. See Lando & Rose, supra note 4, at 478 (France); James Beardsley, Compelling Contract Performance in France, I Hastings Int'l Comp. L. Rev. 93 (1977) (France); Eugen Bucher, Law of
Contracts, in Introduction to Swiss Law 107, 115 (Francois Dessemontet ed., 2004) (Switzerland).
"Lando and Rose report that enforcement of specific performance in France appears limited to the enforcement of
construction contracts tinder threat of a mandated cover purchase or for the delivery of already completed goods.
Lando & Rose, supra note 4, at 479.
49

1d. at 476.

olid at 478.
"Jan Hellner, Specific Performance, in Swedish Contract Law 15 (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law).
"Luca Ficetola, Comparing Remedies for Breach of Contract in Italian and English Law 10 (U. London School of
Law, Working Paper), available at <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1990791>.
"Lando & Rose, supra note 4, at 475-77. The plaintiff can bring criminal suit against the defendant should it fail to
perform, but, according to Lando and Rose, there has only been one such suit in recent times. From a study of all
cases reported in the Danish Weekly Law Report between 1950-2000, they found only two cases where specific
performance was demanded and none where it was granted. They conclude that specific performance in Denmark
is dead in all but name. Id. at 474.
54

Pattison & Herron, supra note 46, at 475.
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In the United States and other common-law countries, the preference for damages
over specific performance is not as clear-cut as may appear from formaljudicial pronouncements. Although common-law systems ostensibly prefer damages, courts often award specific performance on the theory that the remedy at law is inadequate. 5 The stringency of
the rule appears to be softening; 6 for example, whereas in times past courts in sales
litigation allowed specific performance only for transactions involving unique goods, more
recently courts have dispensed with this requirement, allowing specific performance when
damages are considered to be inadequate, even if the goods are not unique. 7 The Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) also nudges judges toward a middle ground of granting specific
performance. UCC § 2-716 calls for specific performance in the case of unique goods as well
as "in other proper circumstances." The section's first comment states that "this Article
seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts have shown in connection with the
specific performance of contracts of sale."5 The UCC also calls for specific performance
when the "parties have agreed to that remedy"-thus endorsing the ability of parties to
contract around the traditional rule.59
International agreements and standards also reflect a substantial degree of congruence with international standards. While the U.N. Convention for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), and the Draft Common
Frame of Reference (DCFR) each specify that specific performance shall be an available
remedy for breach, each likewise provides a hefty list of situations in which it shall
not be granted."o CISG explicitly states that judges are not required to grant specific
performance if it is contrary to what the court would have ruled given its own

5

5Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 691 (1990) ("Courts have escaped
the rule by defining adequacy in such a way that damages are never an adequate substitute for plaintiffs loss. Thus,
our law embodies a preference for specific relief if plaintiff wants it."). See also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
Irreparable Iniury Rule (1991); Caprice L. Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 Wash. &Lee
L. Rev. 1027, 1034 (2011) ("In my opinion, the rule is not alive and well but, rather, rattles about like the undead.").
"See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 746-47 (4th ed. 2004) ("The tendency is, however, to liberalize the granting of
specific performance and injunction by enlarging the classes of cases in which damages are regarded as an inadequate
remedy. The contemporary approach is to compare remedies to determine which is more effective in affording
suitable protection to the injured party's legally recognized interest, which is usually that party's expectation interest.
The concept of adequacy has thus tended to become relative, and the comparison more often leads to granting
equitable relief than was historically the case.").
57

See Mark P. GergenJohn M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for
Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 225 (2012) ("In times long past, specific performance of a contract
to sell goods was limited to unique goods. This rule has softened to allow specific performance in situations in which
damages are an inadequate remedy for any reason, at least if other considerations do not cut against injunctive
relief.") (footnote omitted).
"UCC §2-716, comment 1.
5

9UCC § 2-716(1).

'De Vries, supra note 4.
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law.' Meanwhile, PECL and DCFR have included the least common denominator of
exceptions to specific performance: not for personal service contracts, not if it creates
unreasonable burden or expense.12
Overall, comparative analysis suggests that successful legal systems can support substantial difference in contract remedies, but that the degree of convergence in remedial
regimes is larger than would appear from an analysis of black-letter law alone.
B. Experimental or Statistical Studies
There is by now an impressive literature analyzing contracts from an experimental or
statistical point of view." Only a few papers, however, address issues pertinent to contract
remedies. Sloof et al. developed a game-theoretical model to test the efficiency of breach
remedies." They allowed 80 volunteers to earn cash, an average of $21, based on performance in a two-hour computer game. The game asked them to choose various levels of
reliance investment for theoretical contracts, and to do so under various remedy defaults.
Participants made more efficient investments when the default was specific performance as
opposed to liquidated damages. The authors conclude that specific performance might

"Id. at 583-84 (quoting CISC art. 28: "If, in accordance with the provisions of this convention, one party is entitled
to performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by
this Convention.").
52

Id. at 587-88.

"'In addition to our own work cited in note 7 supra, see, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The
Card Act and Beyond, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 967 (2012); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration
Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9J. Empirical Legal Stud. 536 (2012); Adam B. Badawi,
Relational Governance and Contract Damages: Evidence from Franchising, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 743 (2010);
Erin O'Hara O'Connor, KennethJ. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 Iowa L.
Rev. 133 (2012); Randall Thomas, Erin O'Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment
Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 959 (2010); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are
"Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38J. Legal Stud.
309, 312-13 (2009); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case
of Software License Agreements, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 447 (2008); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a
Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 677
(2007); StewartJ. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top
Executives Bargain For? 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 231 (2006); Omri Ben-Shahar & JamesJ. White, Boilerplate and
Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, in "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium,
104 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (2006); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real

World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud. 281 (2003); Mary M. Shirley & Lixin
Colin Xu, Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts Between Government and
State Enterprises, 14J. L. Econ. & Org. 358 (1998). For general discussions of the potential contributions of empirical
analysis to contract law scholarship, see, e.g., George S. Geis, Automating Contract Law, 83 NYU L. Rev. 450 (2008);

Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 Yale L.J. 881, 900 (2003); Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1033; David V. Snyder, Go Out and Look: The
Challenge and Promise of Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law, 80 Tulane L. Rev. 1009, 1009-10 (2006); Eric A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure? 112 Yale L.J. 829 (2003).
"Randolph Sloof, Hessel Oosterbeek, Arno Riedl &Joep Sonnemans, Breach Remedies, Reliance and Renegotiation,

26 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 263 (2006).
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perform better than judicially awarded or liquidated damages as a device for encouraging
efficient reliance expenditures.6 5
Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron surveyed a representative sample of Americans, presenting them with a scenario involving a breached home renovation contract and asking them
to set damages and express a preference for either damages or specific performance.6 6 They
found that the respondents expressed surprisingly strong support for specific performance
as a remedy: "Not only did 75 percent of participants believe that the promisor ought to
perform rather than pay damages, 66.7 percent of subjects believed that the court should
enforce specific performance. Subjects thought that even supracompensatory damages
were a morally inferior remedy to performance . . ."'
In a subsequent paper, Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman theorize that the marked
preference for injunctive relief is evidence of dignitary harm associated with contract
breach.6 6 Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman found that respondents demanded greater
damages when breaches of contract were efficient and opportunistic, as when the promisor
breaches because she received a better offer from a third party, in contrast with an
unintentional breach caused by cost overruns.
Using web-based questionnaires, Wilkinson-Ryan investigated how liquidated
damages provisions in contracts affected parties' decisions about whether to breach.
Subjects were more willing to exploit efficient-breach opportunities when the contract in
question includes a liquidated damages clause. Wilkinson-Ryan concludes that "when interpersonal obligations are informal or underspecified, people act in accordance with shared
community norms, like the moral norm of keeping promises. However, when sanctions for
uncooperative behavior are specified or otherwise formalized between the parties, behavior
becomes more strategic and more self-interested."O
Despite these contributions, the empirical literature on specific performance versus
contract damages remains quite undeveloped. Our investigation revealed no papers
analyzing a data set of actual contracts instead of employing experiments or survey methodology. The paucity of empirical investigation in this area lends a certain degree of
abstractness to the analytical discussions, which may depend fundamentally on untested

5

1d. at 291. ("Our results ... suggest that a simple specific performance clause may perform better than a carefully
determined liquidated damages breach remedy. Put differently, to protect reliance expenditures it may be preferable
to use a 'property rule' rather than a 'liability rule'.").

'Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &Jonathan Baron, MoralJudgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 405 (2009).
6

1d. at 420.

'Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1003 (2010).
"'Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 Mich. L. Rev.
633 (2010).

70 1d. at 633.
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assumptions about how people actually behave in real-world contractual settings." The
shortage of empirical evidence has even led some to bemoan the lack of studies on the
72
topic; as one commentator puts it, "more empirical research would be helpful."

VI.

DATA AND HYPOTHESES

A. The Data

The data consist of 12 types of material contracts contained as exhibits to Form 8-K "current
report" filings with the SEC in 2002.7' Form 8-K must be filed by SEC-reporting firms to
disclose certain material corporate events or changes that have not previously been
reported by the company." We searched all Form 8-K filings and coded information about
any contract that fit into one of Table 1's categories. We eliminated contracts that did not
fit into one of the 12 contract types described below and 67 contracts for which suitable fee
clause information was not available. The resulting sample consisted of 2,347 contracts.
We coded the contracts for a variety of contract terms, including terms related to the
settlement of disputes that might arise under the contract, as well as information on the
nature and location of the contracting parties. We also coded the type of contract, as shown
in Table 1. For 11 contract categories, six months' worth of contracts, covering the period

Table 1: Types of Contracts Studied (Number of
Contracts in Parentheses)
Asset sale/purchase (299)
Bond indentures (154)
Credit commitments (215)
Employment (109)
Licensing (46)
Mergers (410)

Pooling and servicing (169)
Securities purchase (442)
Security agreements (35)
Settlements (71)
Trust agreements (45)
Underwriting (352)

SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan.
2002 toJuly 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
SOURCE:

"See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Promises and Prices, in Symposium-Contract as Promise at 30: The Future of
Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 735, 772, 773 (2012) (noting cases where theoretical arguments depend on
empirical assumptions); Katz, supra note 19, at 785 (arguments for the damages remedy depend on "empirical
presuppositions").
7

George Triantis, Promissory Autonomy, Imperfect Courts, and the Immorality of the Expectation Damages Default,
in Symposium-Contract as Promise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 827, 840 n.39 (2012);
see also Klass, supra note 43, at 147 ("One wants some empirical evidence for Markovits and Schwartz's empirical
interpretive claim.").
"See Table 1.
74

For the current rules on filing a Form 8-K, see Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 8-K, <http://sec.gov/
about/forms/form8-k.pdf> (specifying certain material events that an issuer must report by filing a Form 8-K with tite
Securities and Exchange Commission).
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January 1 to June 30, 2002, were studied. For merger contracts, the study covered a
seven-month period from January 1 to July 31, 2002. The slightly expanded period for
merger contracts draws on our earlier work on choice of law and choice of forum in merger
contracts.7 Most of the contract types are self-explanatory. "Pooling and servicing" contracts are used in mortgage pass-through and other asset-backed securities arrangements;
they represent agreements under which an owner transfers receivables to a trustee, which
holds title to and collects the income from the assets and passes the funds through to
investors." Trust agreements establish these trusts and define certain of their powers and
responsibilities.

77

Securities purchase agreements were the most frequent contract type, accounting for
18.8 percent of the total. Credit-related contracts-bond indentures, credit commitments,
pooling and servicing agreements, and security agreements-accounted for another 24
percent. Merger contracts were about 17 percent of the sample but note that they had one
extra month of coverage in the data. Together, the contract types offer a reasonably rich
variety of relations. Several contract types, including the credit-related contracts, obviously
involve substantial financial institutions. Others, asset sale/purchase and merger contracts,
typically involve corporate restructurings. Settlements involved resolution of disputes.
Employment contracts offer insights into dispute resolution contract terms in agreements
between key employees and large corporate employers.
The key outcome variable in this study is the contracts' treatment of remedies, with
particular focus on the remedy commonly referred to as specific performance. To determine whether a contract included specific performance as a remedy, we used terms associated with departures from the default damages rule. We searched the retrieved SEC
documents for the following terms: "specific!, injunc!, irre! (to capture Irreparable and
Irrevocable), adequate, equit!, remedies, relief." The "!" symbol in some of the search terms
is the commonly used symbol to include any combination of characters that follow the root
term. For example, "injunc!" would include documents that contain the words "injunction"
or "injunctive." Documents that satisfied the search term were then read to ascertain
whether they in fact addressed specific performance.
Search terms, however broad, may not capture the full diversity of contractual clauses
relating to specific performance. For example, underwriting agreements often involve
more than one underwriter of issued securities. A common term in underwriting agree-

"See Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, supra note 8, at 1981, 1983-84.
"See, e.g., Circuit City Credit Card Master Trust, Form 8-K, Exh. 4.2: Amended and Restated Master Pooling Service

Agreement, at 41-187, Dated as of Dec. 31, 2001, filedJan. 31, 2002, Doc. No. 02523859. See generally Thomas E.
Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1655, 1662 (2004) (describing this
type of agreement as a particular asset-backed security-a pure pass-through certificate-in which "the owner of the
receivables transfers them to a trustee pursuant to a trust agreement in exchange for certificates that represent a 100
percent beneficial ownership interest in the receivables").
"See, e.g., First Consumers National Bank, Form 8-K, Exh. 4.3, Trust Agreement Between First Consumers Credit
Corporation, as Seller, and Bankers Trust Company, as Owner Trustee, at 213-45, dated as of Mar. 1, 2001, and
amended and restated as of Dec. 31, 2001, filed Jan. 31, 2002, Doc. No. 02524022 See Planck, supra note 75, at

1662-67.
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ments requires nondefaulting underwriters to purchase securities that should have been
purchased by a defaulting underwriter." This does not require specific performance by a
defaulting underwriter but can achieve similar effect from the issuer's perspective if the
nondefaulting underwriters must purchase the defaulted securities. To the extent that the
securities issuer achieves the functional equivalent of specific performance, albeit not from
the defaulting contractual counterparty, the nondefaulting underwriter provision suggests
a demand for specific performance in underwriting contracts." Such provisions continue to
be used frequently as of this writing."o
B. Hypotheses

We separate our hypotheses into two groups. The first group of hypotheses is based on
considerations that are external to the particular contracts in our sample. These hypotheses
relate to ex ante views of the benefits of specific performance, the nature of the relationships between the parties to the extent derivable from the contracts we observe, the likely
specific appeal of specific performance in some types of transactions, such as mergers and
loan transactions, and the parties' connection to a civil-law or common-law background.
Each of these factors might be expected to be associated with the rate of providing for
specific performance in any relevant set of contracts. These hypotheses, however, are not
based on the parties' behavior as evidenced by other terms in the sample contracts.

"See, e.g., Northwestern Corporation, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: 8.10% Trust Preferred Securities Underwriting Agreement
§ 10, at 24,Jan. 24, 2002, filedJan. 31, 2002, SEC File No.: 001-10499, Accession No.: 0000912057-02-003623; Bank of
America Corporation, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: BAC Capital Trust II 7% Capital Securities (Liquidation Amount of $25 per
Capital Security) Underwriting Agreement §8, at 23, Jan. 24, 2002, filed Jan. 31, 2002, SEC File No.: 001-06523,
Accession No.: 0000895527-02-000010. Both underwriting agreements contain the following or similar language:
If one or more of the Underwriters shall fail at Closing Time or the relevant Date of Delivery, as the case may
be, to purchase the Preferred Securities which it or they are obligated to purchase under this Agreement (the
"Defaulted Securities"), the Representatives shall have the right, within 24 hours thereafter, to make arrangements for one or more of the non-defaulting Underwriters, or any other underwriters, to purchase all, but not
less than all, of the Defaulted Securities....
Variations on this language appears in many underwriting agreements. Gulf Power Company, Form 8-K, Exh.I.1:
$45,000,000 Series E 6.00% Senior Notes Underwriting Agreement § 10, Jan. 18, 2002, filed Jan. 30, 2002, SEC File
No.: 000-02429, Accession No.: 0000044545-02-000002 (obligating nondefaulting underwriters to purchase defaulted
securities); Ford Motor Company, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: Ford Motor Company Capital Trust II, _% Cumulative
Convertible Trust Preferred Securities (Liquidation Preference $50 per Preferred Security) [Form of Underwriting
Agreement] § 10, at 22, -, 2002, filedJan. 30, 2002, SEC File No.: 001-03950, Accession No.: 0000950124-02-000164
(obligating nondefaulting underwriters to purchase defaulted securities).
"Underwriters may be more willing to agree to specific performance by nondefaulting underwriters when multiple
underwriters share this risk. When only one additional underwriter is present, there may be less willingness to bear
this risk. Nelnet Student Loan Funding, LLC, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: Nelnet Student Loan Trust 2002-1, $1,036,270,000
Student Loan Asset-Backed Notes Underwriting Agreement § 11, at 20, May 9, 2002, filed June 3, 2002, SEC File No.:
333-82280, Accession No.: 0000870156-02-000034 (remaining underwriter has the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase defaulted notes).
'E.g., NYSE Euronext, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: NYSE Euronext $850,000,000 2.000% Notes Due 2017 Underwriting
Agreement § 10, at 22, Oct. 1, 2012, filed Oct. 5, 2012, SEC File No.: 001-33392 Accession No.: 0000950103-12-005290
(obligating nondefaulting underwriters to purchase defaulted securities).
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The second group of hypotheses builds on our prior research using the same contracts studied here. These hypotheses exploit the knowledge we have gained by substantial
prior study of the sample contracts. We have published results relating to these contracts'
use or rejection of several default contract rules. Our prior findings show (1) overwhelming
acceptance of the default rule of access to ajudicial forum, in contrast to arbitration, as the
preferred forum for adjudication; (2) substantial acceptance of the default rule of availability of jury trial in the judicial forum; (3) substantial rejection of the default American
rule on attorney fees, under which each party pays its own litigation costs; and (4) approximately even division between specifying a litigation forum compared to accepting the risk
of default jurisdiction and venue rules determining the litigation forum.
These prior findings are relevant to studying use of specific performance clauses
because they constitute information about the parties' willingness to invest the time and
effort to specify nondefault terms in these contracts. Parties who invested the time and
effort to specify, for example, arbitration or waiver ofjury trial, are more likely to invest the
time and effort to address the topic of specific performance rather than passively accept the
default rule disfavoring specific performance.
1. Hypotheses Based on External Considerations
We explore five hypotheses based on general considerations relating to specific performance, the parties' relationships, the type of contract, and the parties' background legal
systems.
1. The data will reveal substantiallevels of opting out of the traditionaldamages rule.

This hypothesis is based on the literature, cited above, which demonstrates that, at a
minimum, no consensus exists as to the respective advantages and disadvantages of
damages and specific performance as remedies for contract breach. If contracting parties
credit the argument that specific performance generates more efficient outcomes, they will
tend to opt out of the damages rule as a matter of self-interest. Contracting parties might
also opt out of the damages remedy to the extent they accept the moral argument in favor
of specific performance, provided that their decisions about contract terms are at least
partially determined by considerations of morality in addition to self-interest.
2. Parties will opt out of the damages rule more frequently in the case of relationalcontracts.
The hypothesis with respect to relational contracts is based on several considerations. First,
such contracts are likely to be ones where the parties are averse to breach. Theory predicts
that specific performance remedies reduce the probability of breach relative to damages
remedies."' Thus we predict that waivers of the irreparable harm condition will be observed

"See Aaron Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12
J. L. Econ. & Org. 98 (1996); Aaron Edlin & Stephen Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal
Investment, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 478 (1996); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Moral Hazard and Verifiability:
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more frequently in relational contracts. Second, relational contracts are likely to induce
greater expenditures on reliance, some of which would not be compensable under a
damages remedy." To avoid loss of reliance expenditures, the contracting parties are likely
to waive the irreparable harm condition. Third, parties to relational contracts may opt for
specific performance in order not to introduce uncertainty into contract negotiations-a
point developed in work by Alan Schwartz," who reasons that specific performance reduces
uncertainty about the remedy a court would award for breach and, therefore, also reduces
84
opportunities for opportunistic behavior.
3. Parties will opt out of the damages rule more frequently in the case of merger contracts.
Merger contracts involve acquisitions of firms operating as going concerns. Since these are
difficult to value, we predict that the parties will prefer specific performance to damages as
a remedy for breach, at least when the contract does not contain explicit termination fees."
For example, one merger agreement's specific performance clause states:
The parties agree that irreparable damage would occur, and that the parties would not have any
adequate remedy at law, in the event that any of the provisions of this Agreement were not
performed in accordance with their specific terms or were otherwise breached."
However, the omission of a specific performance term in a merger contract does not
necessarily imply that the parties disfavored this remedy. Contracts drafted in 2001 probably
reflected special awareness of the fact that specific performance could often be awarded in
merger contracts due to a much-discussed decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery the
previous year,87 which held under New York law that a breaching party was required to go
through with a merger agreement-in other words, ordering specific performance of the

The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency, 59 Econometrica 1735 (1991); Alexander Triantis & George Triantis, Timing
Problems in Contract Breach Decisions, 541 J. L. & Econ. 163 (1999).
mE.g., Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Regulating Contractual Formation: Precontractual Reliance, Sunk Costs, and
Market Structure, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1977, 1979 (2007) (precontractual reliance expenditures are relationship specific
and not wholly recoverable).
"See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in Peter Newman, ed., The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law (London: Macmillan Reference 1998).
"See Schwartz, supra note 35.

"See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 Vanderbilt
L. Rev. 1161, 1168 (2010) (finding that the "vast majority" of private equity transactions included a right for the seller
to seek the remedy of specific performance).
5

8 Agreement and Plan of Merger, Dated as of May 7, 2002, By and Among Olin Corporation, Plumber Acquisition
Corp., and Chase Industries § 8.09.
7
8

IBP, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).

48

Eisenbergand Miller

merger contract. In ordering the remedy, the court observed that damages were difficult to
quantify, that the merger continued to make strategic sense, and that the combined firm
could be effectively managed if specific performance were granted-features that are likely
to be present in many merger deals. Nevertheless, although the parties may be able to
obtain specific performance ex post even in the absence of an opt-out clause, the presence
of such a class cannot hurt and may help cement the argument in favor of the specific
performance remedy.
4. Parties will opt out of the damages rule more frequently in the case of contracts involving counterparties
from civil-law countries, but not in the case of counterpartiesfrom common-law countries.

This hypothesis rests on the comparative research discussed above, which reveals that
civil-law countries tend to administer regimes of contract remedies that formally endorse
specific performance as a remedy. However, since this research reveals that the contrast
between civil- and common-law rules is often not clear-cut, it may be that the issue of
contract remedies will not be salient in many cases where the counterparties are from
jurisdictions with formally conflicting remedial rules.
5. Partieswill opt out of the damages rule lessfrequently in the case offinancial contracts.

This hypothesis is based on financial contracts typically requiring the payment of money. In
such cases, damages will usually be an adequate substitute for performance; or, alternatively, since the measure of specific performance would be the same as the measure of
damages liability, the parties have no particular reason to opt out of the damages rule.
However, even financial contracts may provide for specific performance for obligations
other than the obligation to pay interest and principal. Covenants to perform can cover a
range of behavior, breach of which may be difficult to value, thus creating an incentive for
specific performance provisions."
2. Hypotheses Related to Treatment of Other Default Rules in These Contracts
Additional hypotheses we explore are related and are in a sense a single hypothesis that we
can test using different contract clauses. The contracts' treatment of four other default
rules (arbitration, jury trial, attorney fees, litigation forum) provides information about the
parties' willingness, in these contracts, to transcend default rules. We expect that departing
from any default rule is associated with departing from other default rules. This is because

"A discussion of default provisions in indentures states:
Where the obligor's default arises from a failure to abide by an obligation (other than its obligation to pay
interest and principal), the indenture trustee and bondholders may seek an injunction or specific performance.
In certain cases, the courts may even permit such a suit before the default matures into an event of default
under the trust indenture. See Guardian Trust Co. v. Whitecliff Portland Cement & Chalk Co., 109 F. 523 (5th
Cir. 1901). 556 PLI/Comm 23: Practising Law Institute, Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series,
PLI Order No. A4-4318. Steven R. Gross, Richard F. Hahn, Azizah Y. al-Hibri & George E.B. Maguire, Restructuring Public Debt Outside of Chapter 11, in Investing in the Troubled Company 1990, 23, 48 (Oct. 1-2, 1990).
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parties who contracted around at least one default rule had to expend effort to do so and
we expect that willingness to expend that effort is not limited to a single default rule. Parties
who modified any default rule thus might be expected to modify other default rules. In the
context of specific performance clauses, we therefore forecast that contracts that depart
from other default rules are more likely to depart from the default damages rule. This
translates into four additional testable hypotheses.
6. Parties will opt out of the damages rule more frequently in the case of contracts containingmandatory
arbitrationclauses.

This hypothesis, motivated by the expected associations among waiving default rules, may
have to be tempered by a countervailing consideration specific to the default rule waived via
an arbitration clause (availability of ajudicial forum). Where a contract contains a mandatory arbitration clause, the dispute will very likely be resolved by an arbitrator. Although
arbitrators have the formal authority to award specific performance as well as damages, to
the extent that the expectation is that the award will consist of money payments," the
parties may anticipate and prefer that the remedy, if any, take the form of damages rather
than specific performance. So the willingness to question the default rule of access to a
judicial forum, while forecasting willingness to question the default damages rule, may be
outweighed by an expectation of damages in arbitration.
7. Parties will opt out of the damages rule more frequently in the case of contracts containingjury trial
wavers.

In the case of the jury trial default rule, an additional consideration strengthens the likely
effect of willingness to depart from one rule being evidence of willingness to depart from
another rule. The presence of a jury trial waiver in a contract indicates that the parties
prefer courts to civil juries as factfinders in disputes over their contracts. Because specific
performance is an equitable remedy, it will be ordered by a court, whereas damages, the
classic legal remedy, will often be determined by ajury. If the parties prefer courts to juries,
they may opt out of the damages rule in order to obtain further assurance that their
preferred decisionmaker will be selected to adjudicate their disputes.
8. Partieswill opt out of the damages rule morefrequently in the case of contracts that departfrom the default
American Rule governing attorneyfees.

Willingness to depart from the default fee rule is again evidence that the parties, or their
attorneys, thought through the issues relating to default rules governing dispute resolution.
Parties willing to invest in negotiating a nondefault fee rule may also be more likely to
negotiate out of the default damages rule.

"See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration's Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus ofAdjudication and Contract, in Winter
2010 Symposium Rising Stars: A New Generation of Scholars Looks at Civil Justice, Fifteenth Annual Clifford

Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 431, 479 (2010).

50

Eisenberg and Miller

9. Parties will opt out of the damages rule more frequently in contracts containingforum selection or choice
of law clauses.

Unlike arbitration andjury trial waivers, the presence of a forum selection clause is not easily
associated with some normative insight about the parties' preference for the default damages
rule. In the case of forum selection clauses, the evidence of willingness to depart from default
rules is likely the dominant effect. That is, the presence of a forum selection clause in a
contract indicates that the parties, or their attorneys, have evaluated some of the issues
concerning how the dispute will be litigated. In such a case, the parties may also be more
likely to make a deliberate decision to opt out of the damages rule rather than allowing the
default rule to govern. Although similar reasoning applies to the relation between contracts
specifying a choice of law clause and the expected presence of a specific performance clause,
the inference of more careful thought with respect to having specified a choice of law clause
cannot easily be tested. This is because virtually all the contracts in our sample specify a choice
of law whereas only 39 percent of contracts specify a choice of forum."o
10. Parties will opt out of the damages rule less frequently in the case of contracts selecting a New York or
Delawareforum.

Our prior study of choice of forum clauses in these contracts showed that sophisticated
contracting parties tended to prefer New York and Delaware courts as the source of forum
governing large commercial contracts." If this preference reflects confidence in the quality
and reliability of the New York and Delaware court systems, the parties might be willing to
trust that the determination of damages will be reasonably accurate in these courts. On the
other hand, if New York or Delaware was not chosen as a litigation forum, the parties may
be less willing to trust that the courts from other states will accurately assess damages. In
such cases, the parties may prefer to select specific performance as a remedy, since specifying the remedy may give less scope to the discretion of the courts.
The association between departing from more than one default rule is, of course, not
limited to associations between the treatment of other default rules and the treatment of
specific performance. Since this study, together with our prior studies, 2 reports individual
default rule information for five default rules (including specific performance), we can
analyze the associations of departure rates across all pairs of default rules. We first present
results relating to specific performance and then include analysis of the associations among
other departure rules in the discussion of results in Section VI.

"'Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight to New York, supra note 7, shows that such a high proportion of contracts specified
choice of law that the number not specifying choice of law was not mentioned, id. at 1490 (tbl. 2), whereas choice of
forum was specified in only 39 percent of contracts. Id. at 1504 (tbl. 11).
'Lid. at 1504 (showing that only Delaware and New York accounted for at least 10 percent of the contracts specifying
a litigation forum). Forum selection clauses are ordinarily enforced in U.S. courts. E.g., Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 80 (1989) ("The parties' agreement as to the place of the action will be given effect unless it is
unfair or unreasonable."); Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight to New York, supra, at 1503 n.79.
2

" See sources cited at note 7 supra.

Damages Versus Specific Performance

V.

51

RESULTS

Our specific performance results first show the relation between each explanatory variable
of interest and whether a contract contained a specific performance clause. We then report
regression models and classification and regression tree (CART) results that account for
multiple explanatory variables.
A. BivariateResults
Our first hypothesis is that there will be substantial levels of opting out of the traditional
damages rule. What counts as substantial is a subjective question and we therefore approach
this hypothesis in two ways. Table 2's third row reports the number and percent of contracts
that included provisions allowing for specific performance. The express allowance of
specific performance in 31.5 percent of the contracts, though not a majority of contracts,
is a substantial rate of authorizing specific performance. The substantial rate confirms the
first hypothesis, namely, that the contracts under review frequently opt out of the traditional damages rule."

Table 2:

Rate of Accepting Default Rule, by Kind of Dispute Resolution Clause
Number of Contracts

Dispute Resolution Clause

Accept
Default
Rule

Opt Out
of Default
Rule

Arbitration (default no arbitration)
Jury trial (default= no waiver)
Specific performance (default = not available)
Attorney fees (default= American Rule)

2,554
2,256
1,604
870

304
560
737
1,477

Percent of Contracts

Total

Accept
Default
Rule

Opt Out
of Default
Rule

2,858
2,816
2,341
2,347

89.4%
80.1%
68.5%
37.1%

10.6%
19.9%
31.5%
62.9%

NOTE: The major differences among the numbers of contracts in the total column is due to excluding the contract
category "Other" from this study.
SOURCES: Eisenberg and Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 7, at 351 (tbl. 2); Eisenberg & Miller, The
English vs. the American Rule, supra note 7, at 352 (tbl. 2); Eisenberg & Miller, Do juries Add Value? supra note 7,
at 553 (tbl. 2); SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database,Jan. 2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types
other than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

"The contracts we review in this article are far from the only ones to contain clauses opting out of the traditional rule.
For example, confidentiality agreements in oil and gas transactions frequently contain such language. See Margaret
L. Meister, Confidentiality Agreements and Due Diligence, in Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, Special
Institute: Due Diligence in Mining and Oil & Gas Transactions, 2010 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
Institute Paper No. 6 (2010) (setting forth model confidentiality agreement containing the provision that "Recipient
agrees that if this Agreement is breached, or if a breach hereof is threatened, the remedy at law may be inadequate,
and therefore, without limiting any other remedy available at law or in equity, an injunction, restraining order,
specific performance, and other forms of equitable relief or money damages or any combination thereof shall be
available to Provider"). Opt-out clauses are also apparently ubiquitous in private equity deals. See Afra Afsharipour,
Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1161, 1168
(2010).

52

Eisenberg and Miller
Table 3: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by
Type of Contract
Include SP: Number

No

Yes

297

54.9

45.1

153
215
109
45

55.6
87.0
42.2
66.7

44.4
13.0
57.8
33.3

219
16
158
13
18

410
168
441
35
71

46.6
90.5
64.2
62.9
74.6

53.4
9.5
35.8
37.1
25.4

3
2
737

45
352
2,341

93.3
99.4
68.5

6.7
0.6
31.5

Contract Type

No

Yes

Total

Asset sale purchase

163

134

Bond indentures
Credit commitments
Employment contracts
Licensing

85
187
46

30

68
28
63
15

Mergers
Pooling & servicing
Securities purchase
Security agreements
Settlements

191
152
283
22
53

42
350
1,604

Trust agreements
Underwriting
Total

Include SP: Percent

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan.
2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

Table 2 also offers a basis for comparing specific performance clauses to other
dispute resolution clauses we have studied. In accordance with black-letter law, we regard
the default specific performance rule to be that specific performance is not available. One
can compare the 31.5 percent rate of rejecting that default rule with the rates at which
contracting parties reject other contractual default rules. As Table 2 shows, the parties
contract out of two other core dispute resolution features, no access to arbitration and
access to jury trial, at much lower rates, 10.6 percent and 19.9 percent, respectively. But
parties contract out of the default American Rule on attorney fees at a much higher rate
than they contract out of the default damages rule. All differences in rates between the
specific performance dispute resolution clause rate and the other three rates are highly
statistically significant, with p < 0.001.
Table 3 reports the rate at which different contract types included specific performance as a remedy. The inclusion rate varied substantially, with low rates of 0.6 percent and
6.7 percent in underwriting contracts" and pooling and servicing agreements, respectively,
to high rates of 57.8 percent and 53.4 percent in employment contracts and merger
agreements, respectively. The high rate of specific performance in merger agreements
supports our hypothesis that parties will opt out of the default damages rule more fre-

"One of the underwriting contracts that does mention specific performance provides for it by the issuer of securities
for the benefit of the purchasers. Exchange and Registration Rights Agreement 9(b).E. The typical underwriting
agreement makes no mention of specific performance. E.g., Underwriting Agreement Among Asset Backed Funding
Corporation, Bank of America Securities LLC, Countrywide Securities Corporation, Well Fargo Brokerage Services,
LLC (filed 4/9/2002).
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Table 4: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by
Relational Contract Status
Include SP: Number

Include SP: Percent

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

Nonrelational

1,125

599

1,724

65.3

34.7

Relational
Total

437
1,562

135
734

572
2,296

76.4
68.0

23.6
32.0

Contract

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers andJan.
2002 toJuly 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

quently in such cases. The 53.4 percent rate is statistically significantly higher than the rate
in nonmerger contracts (p< 0.001), does not significantly differ from the higher rate in
employment contracts (p= 0.450), and does significantly differ from the next highest rate
of 45.1 percent in asset sale or purchase contracts (p = 0.033). The table's last row shows the
aggregate rate of specific performance clause use to be 31.5 percent, but this increases to
46.4 percent if one regards underwriting contracts as providing for specific performance, as
5
discussed above.9
Table 4 reports the association between specific performance clauses and relational
contract status. Coding contracts' relational status can be imprecise. A settlement, for
example, may terminate a short-term or long-term relation, or it may promote a continued
relation. We coded for relational status based on contract categories, with the following
contract categories coded as more likely to be relational: credit commitments, employment,
licensing, pooling and service agreements, and security agreements; and the following
categories coded as less likely to be relational: asset sale or purchase, bond indentures,
mergers, securities purchase agreements, settlements, and underwritings. We omitted trust
agreements from the sample for purposes of the analysis of relational contracts because the
relational status for these contracts is insufficiently clear.
Table 4 suggests a modest preference for specific performance in nonrelational
contracts. The difference is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001), and contradicts our
hypothesis that parties will opt out of the default damages rule more frequently in relational
contracts.
We hypothesized that parties would opt out of the default damages rule more
frequently in contracts involving counterparties from civil-law countries, but not in the case
of counterparties from common-law countries other than the United States. The data do
not support this hypothesis. Table 5 shows that 34.2 percent of contracts with a civil-law
country counterparty provided for specific performance. This is a higher rate, but not a
statistically significantly higher rate, than the 30.8 percent rate of specific performance in
contracts with only U.S. parties. It is lower than the 39.1 percent rate of specific perfor-

"See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
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Table 5:

Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by Legal System of Parties
Include SP: Number

Legal System

U.S. parties only
Non-U.S. party, common-law country
Non-U.S. party, civil-law country

Total

Include SP: Percent

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

1,460

651

2,111

69.2

30.8

95
48

61
25

156
73

60.9
65.8

39.1
34.2

1,603

737

2,340

68.5

31.5

SP= specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS databaseJan. 2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

Table 6: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by
Financial Contract Status
Include SP: Number

Not financial
Financial
Total

Include SP: Percent

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

1,310
294
1,604

628
109
737

1,938
403
2,341

67.6
73.0
68.5

32.4
27.0
31.5

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers andJan.
2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

mance in contracts with a common-law country counterparty."' Contracts that combine
non-U.S. parties into a single group (Table 5's second and third rows) specified specific
performance 37.6 percent of the time, which is significantly lower (p= 0.038) than the 30.8
percent rate at which U.S. parties' contracts specified specific performance.
Assessing the relation between financial contracts and specific performance requires
categorizing contracts as financial or not financial. We start with a view of financial contracts that includes only the borrowing and repayment of money: bond indentures, credit
commitments, and security agreements. In such contracts, lenders have generally performed and the measure of damages against borrowers is likely not materially different
from what specific performance might require. Table 6 shows the rate of specific performance clauses in these lending contracts compared to other contracts.
As expected, lending agreements tend not to mention specific performance more
than other contracts, and the rates statistically significantly differ (p = 0.039). If one
expands the definition of financial contracts to include the asset-based lending agreements
embodied in pooling and servicing contracts and their corresponding trust agreements

'The rate of specific performance is also not higher in contracts that choose a civil-law country as governing law.
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Table 7: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by
Arbitration Clause Status
Include SP: Number
Contract

Include SP: Percent

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

No arbitration clause
Arbitration clause

1,455
143

615
121

2,070
264

70.3
54.2

29.7
45.8

Total

1,598

736

2,334

68.5

31.5

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan.
2002 toJuly 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

based on their loan characteristics," the gap between financial and other contracts
increases to 20.8 percent of financial contracts including specific performance compared to
35.4 percent of nonfinancial contracts (p<0.001).
It has been asserted that "most arbitral awards contemplate money payments."98 As
noted above, to the extent that parties expect an arbitral award to consist of money
payments," the parties may anticipate and prefer that the remedy, if any, take the form of
damages rather than specific performance. On the other hand, Table 2 shows that few
contracts, only about 11 percent, depart from the default rule of access to ajudicial forum
in favor of a mandatory arbitration clause. As described above, parties who devote sufficient
attention to contractual detail to forego the default judicial forum may be more likely at
least to consider departing from the default damages rule and allow for specific performance. This association may swamp any tendency toward preferring money damages over
specific performance.
Table 7 shows that contracts with arbitration clauses were in fact much more likely to
contain specific performance clauses than are contracts without arbitration clauses. Contracts with arbitration clauses included specific performance clauses 45.8 percent of the
time compared to 29.7 percent of contracts without arbitration clauses (p < 0.001). This is
some evidence that parties willing to forego one default rule are more likely to forego
another default rule.
One possible explanation is that this difference is driven by employment contracts,
which tend to have the highest rates of arbitration clauses.'o Excluding employment
contracts, however, does not narrow the gap in specific performance clause use. About 44

"See text accompanying note 76 supra.
"See Markovits, supra note 89, at 479.
9Id.
'ooEisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 7, at 351 (showing employment contracts to have the
highest rate of arbitration clauses).
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Table 8: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by Jury
Trial Waiver Status
Include SP: Number
Contract

No jury trial waiver
Jury trial waiver

Total

Include SP: Percent

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

1,341

521

1,862

72.0

28.0

263

215

478

55.0

45.0

1,604

736

2,340

68.5

31.5

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan.
2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

percent of nonemployment contracts with arbitration clauses included specific performance clauses compared to 28.7 percent of nonemployment contracts without arbitration
clauses. The gap hardly narrows and remains highly statistically significant (p < 0.001).
Whatever the expected dominance of damages remedies in arbitration, parties preferred
damages relatively less than specific performance in contracts that include arbitration.
Parties who opt out ofjury trials promote the use of equitable remedies, which tend
to be awarded by courts rather than by juries. That preference for equitable remedies may
translate into greater use of specific performance clauses. In addition, as in the case of
arbitration clauses, the great majority of contracts do not include jury trial waivers. Parties
that devote sufficient attention to contractual detail to forego the default rule of jury trial
availability may be more likely to depart from other default rules, including damages being
preferred over specific performance. Table 8 shows that contracts with jury trial waivers
were much more likely to contain specific performance clauses than are contracts without
jury trial waivers clauses. Contracts with jury trial waivers included specific performance
clauses 45.0 percent of the time compared to 28.0 percent of contracts without arbitration
clauses (p < 0.001). This is additional evidence that parties willing to forego one default rule
are more likely to forego another default rule.
Table 9 explores whether an association exists between contracting out of the default
American Rule on attorney fees and contracting out of the default damages rule. Panel A
reports results based on our prior coding of contract fee clauses as accepting or not
accepting the default American Rule."' It suggests a modest positive association, with
parties who rejected the American Rule providing for specific performance in 32.8 percent
of contracts compared to parties who accepted the American Rule accepting specific
performance in 29.2 percent of contracts. The difference is marginally statistically significant (p = 0.070).
This association is stronger under an alternative view of coding underwriting contracts. Panel A of Table 9 treats standard underwriting as specifying the English Rule for
attorney fees. Although we coded underwriting contracts as using the English Rule, the

'Eisenberg & Miller, The English Versus the American Rule, supra note 7, at 370-72.
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Table 9: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by Fee
Clause Status
Include SP: Number
No

Yes

A. Original Coding of American Rule
Reject American Rule
991
484

Accept American Rule

613

253

Include SP: Percent

Total

No

Yes

1,475

67.2

32.8

866

70.8

29.2

Total
1,604
737 2,341
68.5
31.5
B. Recharacterize Underwriting Contracts as American Rule
Contracts
Reject American Rule
677 482
1,159
58.4
41.6
Accept American Rule
927 255
1,182
78.4
21.6

Total

1,604

737

2,341

68.5

31.5

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan.
2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

standard fee clause pattern in underwriting contracts could also reasonably be coded as
accepting the American Rule. We coded most underwriting contracts as adopting the
English Rule because the contracts provide that the securities issuer will pay the underwriter's attorney fees if liability stems from issuer behavior and the underwriter will pay the
issuer's fees if liability is based on underwriter behavior.1 o2 These indemnity provisions at
first seem closer to the English Rule than to the American Rule since parties agree to pay
each other's' fees. And the indemnifiable circumstances covered by the underwriting
contracts involve the most likely kind of lawsuit relating to the issuance of securities, a
third-party action against the issuer and the underwriter. In actions between issuers and
underwriters that do not involve third parties, however, standard underwriting agreements
do not opt out of the American Rule.' So, for example, if the securities issuer sues the
underwriter for breaching its duty to deliver underwriting services, the American Rule
applies and coding these contracts as accepting the American Rule is also reasonable.' 0 4
Panel B of Table 9 shows the results if one characterizes standard underwriting
agreements as accepting the American Rule. It shows a much stronger association between
rejecting the default fee rule and rejecting the default damages rule. Parties who rejected
the American Rule provided for specific performance in 41.6 percent of contracts and

.o.See Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer's Guide to the Operation of Underwriting Syndicates, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 319,
326-27 (1991) ("each of the underwriters severally indemnifies the issuer against liabilities arising out of material
misrepresentations or omissions from the registration statement and prospectus, but only to the extent that those
misrepresentations or omissions were made or omitted in reliance upon written information furnished to the issuer
by the underwriters").
"osVa. Elec. & Power Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. I § 9 (Jan. 29, 2002).
'"Eisenberg & Miller, The English Versus the American Rule, supra note 7, at 373.
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Table 10: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by
Whether Litigation Forum was Specified
Include SP: Number
Contract

No forum specified
Forum specified
Total

Include SP: Percent

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

1,095
505
1,600

349
386
735

1,444
891
2,335

75.8
56.7
68.5

24.2
43.3
31.5

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan.
2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

parties who accepted the American Rule provided for specific performance in only 21.6
percent of contracts. The difference is highly statistically significant (p <0.001).
The presence of a litigation forum selection clause in a contract is another indication
that the parties, or their attorneys, have thought through some of the issues concerning
how the dispute will be litigated. In such a case, the parties may also be more likely to make
a deliberate decision to opt out of the damages rule rather than doing nothing and allowing
the default rule to govern. Table 10 shows the relation between contracts that specified a
litigation forum and contracts that provided for specific performance. Parties who specified
a litigation forum provided for specific performance in 43.3 percent of contracts and
parties who did not specify a litigation forum provided for specific performance in only 24.2
percent of contracts. The difference is highly statistically significant (p <0.001).
We further explore the relation between specifying a litigation forum and specifying
specific performance by focusing on the two states most often specified as litigation venues,
New York and Delaware. We suggested above that confidence in those states' court systems
might induce parties to accept the courts' determination of remedies without the need for
specifying specific performance. Table 11 explores this suggestion. Contrary to our suggestion, contracts specifying Delaware or New York as litigation locales had higher rates of
specific performance clause use than did contracts that did not specify a litigation forum.
Whatever faith parties have in Delaware and New York courts does not translate into greater
willingness to invest those courts with more remedial discretion by remaining contractually
silent about specific performance.
Table II's results for Delaware and New York are noteworthy given the common
claim that Delaware's courts' expertise and predictability help attract legal business.'05 A
substantial difference in specific performance clause use emerged between Delaware forum
contracts and New York forum contracts. Delaware forum contracts included specific
performance clauses 71.7 percent of the time; New York forum contracts included specific
performance clauses at about half that rate, 36.0 percent of the time, a highly statistically

"osE.g., Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight to New York, supra note 7, at 1480 (noting evidence of faith in Delaware
courts).
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Table 11: Rate of Specific Performance Clauses, by
Litigation Forum Choice
Include SP: Number

Include SP: Percent

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

28
249
246

71
140
182

99
389
428

28.3
64.0
57.5

71.7
36.0
42.5

No forum specified

1,081

344

1,425

75.9

24.1

Total

1,604

737

2,341

68.5

31.5

DE
NY
Other

SP = specific performance.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan.
2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers andJan.
2002 toJuly 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

significant difference (p < 0.001). One possible explanation for this difference is the varying
distributions of contract types across the two states. However, controlling for contract type
does not eliminate the difference. For each of the three contract types for which Delaware
or NewYork was the specified litigation forum, and for which both Delaware and NewYork
had at least 10 contracts-assets sales/purchases, mergers, and securities purchaseDelaware forum contracts had higher rates of specific performance clause use than New
York forum contracts. This subsample of three contract types includes 91 Delaware contracts, 190 New York contracts, and the difference in specific performance clause use (74.7
percent for Delaware; 56.3 percent for New York) is significant at p= 0.003.
B. Accountingfor Multiple Explanatory Variables

Because multiple influences may be associated with contracts containing specific performance clauses, regression analysis is useful in assessing whether bivariate results persist
when explanatory factors are taken into account simultaneously. Since the outcome variable of interest, inclusion of a specific performance clause, is dichotomous, we employ
logistic regression.""o
Table 12 reports the regression results. All six models include dummy variables
representing the legal system of the counterparty to the reporting company. For this factor,
contracts involving a non-U.S. party that is from a civil-law country is the reference category.
Models (1) and (4) use dummy variables for contract types, with merger contracts as the
reference category. Models (2), (3), (5), and (6) replace the individual contract types with
variables that represent contract characteristics, dummy variables for relational contracts
and for financial contracts. These variables cannot be included in models with dummy
variables for contract types due to collinearity because the contract characteristic variables
are constructed from the contract type variables. Model (3) differs from Model (2), and
Model (6) differs from Model (5), in the use of use the alternate coding of financial

10

"E.g., A. Colin Cameron & Pravin K. Trivedi, Microeconomics Using Stata 459 (rev. ed. 2010).
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Table 12:

Logistic Regression Models of Presence of Specific Performance Clause
Dependent Variable= Specic Performance Clause Included in Contract
(1)

Asset sale/purchase

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.051**

-0.031

(0.023)

(0.025)

-0.054**

0.005

(0.027)

(0.035)

-0.202***

-0.206***

(0.020)

(0.020)

Licensing

0.031
(0.042)
-0.105***

0.081*
(0.049)
-0.080**

(0.032)

(0.037)

Pooling service

-0.211***

-0.192***

(0.022)

(0.024)

Security agreements

-0.090**
(0.040)
-0.104***

-0.086**
(0.040)
-0.104***

Bond indentures
Credit commitments
Employment contracts

Securities purchase

(0.020)

(0.020)

Trust agreements

-0.141***
(0.025)
-0.201***

-0.133***
(0.026)
-0.190***

Underwriting

(0.022)
-0.367***

(0.025)
-0.355***

Settlements

(0.014)

U.S. legal system
Non-U.S. common law

(6)

(0.015)

0.026

-0.017

-0.003

0.028

-0.003

0.006

(0.043)

(0.057)

(0.056)

(0.042)

(0.056)

(0.055)

0.055
(0.062)

0.048
(0.069)

0.056
(0.069)

0.050
(0.060)

0.048
(0.069)

0.053
(0.069)

-0.106***

-0.045

-0.098***

-0.051

(0.029)

(0.036)

(0.031)

(0.040)

Relational contract

-0.006

-0.011

Financial contract

(0.037)

(0.034)
Financial contract
(including pooling
servicing agreements)

-0.107***
(0.036)

DE forum

-0.080**
(0.041)

0.362***
(0.063)
0.179***
-0.035

NY forum
Other forum

Observations
Pseudo 72

(5)

0.116***

2,340
0.173

2,295
0.010

2,295
0.0156

-0.028
2,340
0.202

0.459***
-0.045
0.128***
-0.032
0.192***

-0.03
2,295
0.052

0.452***
-0.046
0.127***
-0.032
0.184***

-0.03
2,295
0.054

NOTE: The table shows the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on whether a specific performance clause was

included in a contract. Standard errors clustered on reporting company are reported. *p<0.1; **p<0.05;
***p< 0.01.
SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS databaseJan. 2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
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contracts. Note that results for two different financial contract dummy variables are
reported. It treats asset-based lending agreements documented by pooling and servicing
contracts and their corresponding trust agreements as financial contracts.'o Models (4),
(5), and (6) differ from Models (1), (2), and (3) by including dummy variables for the
litigation forum specified, with no litigation forum specified being the reference category.
Our goal in including the litigation forum dummy variables is to assess whether the contract
type results are sensitive to including litigation forum variables since Tables 10 and 11
indicate that the absence of a litigation forum has a strong association with contracts'
treatment of the default damages rule.'
Table 12 reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the outcome
variable. The marginal effects are interpretable as the change in the probability of a
litigation cost denial given a one-unit change in an explanatory variable. For categorical
explanatory variables, this change in probability is in comparison to a reference categorythat is, a value of the explanatory variable against which changes in the outcome probability
are measured.
The reference category for contract types is mergers. This means that the marginal
effects for the other contract types in Models (1) and (3) indicate how much more or less
likely a specific performance clause becomes compared to the baseline case of a merger
contract. No litigation forum being specified is the reference category for the litigation
forum dummy variables in Models (4), (5), and (6).
The two models, (1) and (4), in Table 12 that include dummy variables for contract
type show the marginal effects for those variables to be largely negative and statistically
significant. This suggests that the reference category, mergers, is more likely to include
specific performance clauses than most other contract types. In Model (1), employment
contracts are the only contract type with a positive marginal effect, indicating a higher
probability of a specific performance clause, but the effect is small and does not significantly
differ from mergers. Credit commitments are about 20 percent less likely than merger
agreements to include a specific performance clause. Underwriting agreements are much
less likely to include express specific performance clauses but recall that they could reasonably be characterized as including a form of specific performance."' The model's results
are consistent with Table 3's nonregression rates of specific performance clause use, but we
now control for the legal system of the counterparties to the contract. The legal system
variables themselves are of small marginal effect and statistically insignificant. This largely
confirms Table 5, which shows small differences in specific performance clause use across

t

' oSee text accompanying note 76 supra.
1osWe forego reporting models that include dummy variables for other default dispute resolution clauses (attorney fee
clauses, arbitration clauses, and jury trial waiver clauses) due to likely endogeneity or reverse causation. These models
do not materially change the central results in Table 12. But these models are questionable because they raise a
problem similar to that of including the litigation forum dummy variables. Variables representing these other dispute
resolution clauses may lead, follow, or be simultaneous with the decision to contract for specific performance. We
instead use the CART analysis below to suggest their role in explaining the pattern of specific performance clause use.
'"See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
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legal systems of counterparties, and suggests that any significant difference in that table was
due to not controlling for type of contract.
Model (4) of Table 12 retains the individual contract type dummy variables and adds
controls for clauses that specify a legal forum. Comparing it to Model (1), the marginal
effect for asset sale/purchase contracts decreases slightly relative to mergers and becomes
insignificant. The coefficient for employment contracts increases by 5 percent and becomes
marginally statistically significant. The biggest change is with respect to bond indentures
where, compared to Model (1), the marginal effect changes direction and becomes statistically significant. This change is attributable to the gap between specific performance clause
use in merger contracts and bond indentures being in a different direction and substantially
narrower (59 percent vs. 38 percent) in contracts that do not specify a litigation forum than
it is (52 percent vs.100 percent) in contracts that do specify a litigation forum. With that
qualification, Table 12's results are again consistent with those in Tables 3 and 5.
The results for Models (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Table 12 are sensitive to what contract
types are coded as financial. If one does not characterize pooling and servicing agreements
and their trust agreements as financial contracts, as is done in Models (2) and (5), then
relational contract status is negatively associated with whether one observes a specific
performance clause. But this result changes if one recasts pooling and servicing agreements
and their trust agreements as financial contracts, as is done in Models (3) and (6). Then
relational contract status is not statistically significant; only financial contract status is
statistically significant. These models mainly confirm the unimportance of the legal system
variables using the alternative aggregated coding of contract types.
Models (4), (5), and (6) of Table 12 show litigation forum dummy variables to be
highly statistically significant, which is consistent with the results in Tables 10 and 11. This
set of dummy variables, however, likely suffers from endogeneity or two-way causation
because of the association between inclusion of one nondefault clause in a contract and
inclusion of another, as shown in Section VI.o Dispute resolution clauses' presence in
contracts are likely associated with one another. For example, the models assess the influence of litigation forum clause treatment on the presence of a specific performance clause.
However, the presence of a specific performance clause might also influence the presence
of a litigation forum clause, or the two may be simultaneously influenced by common
factors. The models nevertheless provide some evidence that the principal results in Models
(1) to (3) persist after controlling for the contracts' treatment of litigation forum.
As a check on our regression results, we constructed a classification and regression
tree (CART). CART analysis helps explore how decisions branch at what are believed to be
relevant nodes in the analysis (i.e., at the explanatory variables)."' Each node in a decision

"oA complete model of dispute resolution clause inclusion likely would require a simultaneous equations model and
allow for causation to flow in more than one direction across dispute resolution clauses. We lack a substantial set of
explanatory variables that make estimating such models feasible.
.'See generally Leo Breiman, Jerome H. Friedman, Charles J. Stone & Richard A. Olshen, Classification and
Regression Trees (1984); Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Statistical Analysis of judicial Decision and Legal Rules with
Classification Trees, 7J. Empirical Legal Stud. 202 (2010).
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Figure 1:

Classification and regression tree for specific performance clauses.
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NOTE: This classification tree provides a nonparametric analysis of the relation between hypothesized factors and the dependent variable, the presence of a specific performance clause, in 2,341 contracts. The tree confirms the importance of contract type
and the association of the presence of a specific performance clause with the presence of other dispute resolution clauses.

SOURCE: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS databaseJan. 2002 tojune 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

tree is split into two groups, and the data are then partitioned into those groups to process
the data farther down the tree. This binary partitioning process is then repeated, with child
nodes generating their own subnodes. CART is a useful check on results obtained by logistic
regression because it is nonparametric and therefore does not depend on assumptions
underlying regression models.
Figure 1 presents a CART for our data. Although space constraints prevent presenting a CART that shows the relation to specific performance of less influential variables,
Figure 1 confirms our evidence of strong associations between the presence of a specific
performance clause (Node 0) and contract type and the treatment of other default dispute
resolution clauses. The dummy variable for underwriting is the highest branch (Nodes 1
and 2) in the classification tree, with Node 2 showing the rate of specific performance
clauses in underwriting contracts and Node 1 showing the rate in other contracts. These
contracts' high level in the CART is not surprising given our coding of specific performance
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clauses as almost never being present in underwriting agreements. In light of our discussion
of reasonable alternative coding of underwriting agreements almost all containing implicit
specific performance clauses, it is worth noting that underwriting agreements would retain
their prominence in a CART that coded them as including specific performance. The
dummy variable for mergers is the next highest branch in the CART (Nodes 3 and 4), with
Node 4 showing the rate of specific performance clauses in merger contracts and Node 3
showing the rate in other contracts (excluding underwriting contracts, which are
accounted for in a higher set of nodes). This suggests that large public firms have a strong
ex ante demand for specific performance in merger agreements. Importantly, the merger
node is higher in the CART than are any of the dispute resolution clause variables. This can
be interpreted as meaning that the desire for specific performance in merger contracts is
likely not largely a consequence of the treatment of other dispute resolution clauses in such
contracts. This is evidence that it is the nature of merger transactions that drives the
demand for specific performance clauses.
The two next most prominent branches (Nodes 5, 6, 7, and 8) suggest that treatment
of other dispute resolution clauses-no litigation forum being specified and jury trial being
waived-are strongly associated with the presence of specific performance clauses. Below
these dispute resolution clause branches, contract type again becomes important, with
employment contracts showing high use of specific performance clauses and credit commitments rarely using them. Other variables in the data are less prominent in explaining
the pattern of specific performance clause use. These lower branches in the CART are not
shown in Figure 1.
CART analysis confirms the associations detected in the bivariate and regression
analyses, highlights the importance of case type and litigation forum treatment in explaining the pattern of specific performance use, and provides a useful visualization of the
data.

VI.

DISCUSSION

We further discuss two classes of results. One class is specific to this article's codification of
specific performance clauses. A prominent theme of our codification is variation. Variation
exists both in the rate at which specific performance is mentioned by type of contract and
in the reasons why contracts mention specific performance. The second class of results
incorporates our prior findings with respect to rates of opting out of four other default rules
in the contracts: arbitration clauses, jury trial waiver clauses, litigation forum clauses, and
attorney fee clauses. Understanding rates of opting out of one default rule can help explain
rates of opting out of other default rules.

A. Implications of Variation

The prominence of variation has implications for theories of contractual remedies and
suggests limits on what our somewhat mechanical coding of contract terms can reveal.
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Variation in specific performance specification rates has implications for the theo2
retical debate over justifications for the subordination of specific performance." One
theory argues for maintaining the default subordination approach to specific performance
across all corporate contracts' 13 on the ground that "a promisor who fails to deliver the
promised goods or services but instead transfers the gain to her promisee performs rather
4
than breaches." "

In one perspective, our results support theoretical arguments favoring the default
damages rule. That most of the contracts in our sample do not opt out of contract damages
suggests that most contracting parties are not so dissatisfied with the traditional rule that
they elected to include a specific opt-out clause in their contract. Sophisticated parties to
the contracts in the sample accepting the default damages rule may be taken as some
vindication of theories favoring the default rule. A qualification on this inference is necessary, however. The failure to opt out of the traditional rule does not necessarily indicate that
the rule is efficient or theoretically correct. Although the decision to opt out of the
traditional rule indicates a degree of affirmative intentionality, the failure to opt out of a
background rule may or may not be a considered decision; it is also possible that the parties
simply did not think about the question."'
More importantly, many of the contracts do in fact reject the default rule, and a
majority do so for two contract types, merger agreements and employment agreements, as
shown in Table 3. The varying rates of contracting for specific performance liability suggest
that ubiquitous acceptance of the default damages rule does not capture the reality of the
behavior of sophisticated economic actors, and may be inefficient for some contract categories,just as it seems inconsistent with experimental results about preferences for specific
performance."' As Table 3 shows, over half the merger agreements provided for specific
performance, and more likely would accept specific performance as a term if it were the
default rule. The default damages liability rule required parties to most merger agreements
to raise and negotiate the issue, at added cost and reduced efficiency.
Nor does regarding the transfer of gain being regarded ex ante as performance ring
true in the merger context. The acquiring company wants the assets in the expectation that
gains are to be had, but the ability persuasively to quantify that gain must often be
questionable, which must be at least part of the reason why parties so often expend the

2

" Compare, e.g., Markovits & Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach, supra note 11, with Klass, supra note 43.
" Id. at 1943 ("contract law should retain its traditional commitment to vindicating the promisee's expectation
interest and should protect this interest by a liability rule").
111Id. at 1948.
"'Several studies of contracting behavior suggest that parties often fail to opt out of inefficient background rules. See
Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651 (2006); Lisa
Bernstein, Comment, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L. Rev. 59, 71-72 (1993);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608 (1998).
"For efforts to distinguish a series of experimental results showing a preference for specific performance, see
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1954-55 n.32.

66

Eisenberg and Miller

effort to provide for specific performance. The relatively high rate of specific performance
clauses in a class of contracts closely related to mergers, asset sale agreements (45.1 percent
as shown in Table 3), likely results from parties' similar concerns about the difficulty of
valuing the lost gain in the event of failure to deliver assets. One traditional alternative to
specific performance as a remedy, a different contract price, also is not obviously an
adequate alternative in this context. The optimal price adjustment likely suffers from the
same uncertainty as does quantifying the gain from the transaction.
This is not to say that performance and transfer of gain are always far from equivalent.
The equivalence between performance and transfer of gain is more persuasive in the
context of financial agreements, where the gain is relatively easy to quantify. This provides
support for the default damages rule, but only in a subset of firms' agreements. The parties'
contractual behavior in our sample is consistent with damages being the default rule in this
class of agreements, as we hypothesized and as Table 6 confirms.
Variation in the reasons why specific performance is mentioned also suggests a
limitation of our approach in coding contracts as either endorsing or not mentioning
specific performance. Substantial variation exists in the reasons why specific performance
clauses are or are not used. As noted above, some contracts may not mention specific
performance because the parties assume it will be available when appropriate. Others
mention specific performance seemingly to negate any inference that other terms in a
contract might be interpreted to foreclose or limit specific performance."'7 Other provisions supplementing default damages rules may not address the general availability of
specific performance but instead focus on specific contract defaults. A Fortune 500
company agreement with its chief executive officer addressed remedies for breach of the
officer's contractual covenants not to compete. "Executive agrees that the Company's
remedies at law would be inadequate in the event of a breach or threatened breach of
Section 8 of this Agreement; accordingly, the Company shall be entitled, in addition to its
rights at law, to seek an injunction or other equitable relief without the need to post a
bond."" Still other contracts set forth specific terms that promote specific performance
without referring to it as such, as in the case of underwriting agreements requiring
nondefaulting underwriters to purchase securities allocated to a defaulting underwriter."'

"'Asset Purchase Agreement dated as of Oct. 17, 2001 between Imation and KPG

§ 10.02(c).

5

" Employment Agreement, dated as of Feb. 18, 2002, by and between Honeywell International Inc. ("Honeywell"),
a Delaware corporation (together with its successors and assigns permitted under this Agreement, the "Company"),
and David M. Cote ("Executive") § 8.
5

" See, e.g., Northwestern Corporation, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: 8.10% Trust Preferred Securities Underwriting Agreement
§ 10, at 24,Jan. 24, 2002, filedJan. 31, 2002, SEC File No.: 001-10499, Accession No.: 000091205702-003623; Bank of
America Corporation, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: BAC Capital Trust II 7% Capital Securities (Liquidation Amount of $25 per
Capital Security) Underwriting Agreement § 8, at 23, Jan. 24, 2002, filed Jan. 31, 2002, SEC File No.: 001-06523,
Accession No.: 0000895527-02-000010. Both underwriting agreements contain the following or similar language:
If one or more of the Underwriters shall fail at Closing Time or the relevant Date of Delivery, as the case
may be, to purchase the Preferred Securities which it or they are obligated to purchase under this Agreement
(the "Defaulted Securities"), the Representatives shall have the right, within 24 hours thereafter, to make
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This richness of terms relating to specific performance poses challenges to coding schemes
that do not distinguish among the reasons.
B. Associations with Other Default Dispute Resolution Rules

This study's specific performance clause results, when combined with our earlier studies of
arbitration clauses, jury trial waiver clauses, litigation forum clauses, and attorney fee
20
clauses,o
yields information about acceptance or rejection of five default dispute resolution rules. A natural question is the degree of association among default clause rejection
rates for the five rules.
The dispute resolution clauses relating to default rules cluster logically into two
groups. One group-arbitration clauses, jury trial waiver clauses, and litigation forum
clauses-addresses forum and adjudicator issues. The second group-attorney fee clauses
and specific performance clauses-focuses not on forum but on the substantive remedies
available under the contracts. One might expect the presence of forum and adjudicator
clauses to be strongly associated with one another and the presence of the substantive
clauses to be associated with one another. More generally, do default dispute resolution
rules tend to be rejected individually or in groups?
Table 13 reports a measure of association, the phi (p) coefficient, for each of 10
dispute resolution clause pairs. The phi coefficient is a measure of association between two
categorical variables. In the case of a 2 x 2 table, which each cell in Table 13 summarizes, (p
is equivalent to the correlation coefficient. For each of these coefficients, however, caution
is needed in interpreting the level of the coefficient. Neither T nor the correlation coefficient can achieve the maximum value of 1 in a 2 x 2 table with categorical data. The more
useful information in the table is thus the comparative size of the coefficients, rather than
their absolute levels. The second entry in each cell is the p value measure of statistical
significance for the underlying 2 x 2 table.
Each entry in Table 13 summarizes the contents of a 2 x 2 table. For example, the
table's first cell, in which arbitration clauses are the row variable and specific performance
clauses are the column variable, provides the measure of association for a 2 x 2 table in
which the two rows are the presence or absence of an arbitration clause and the two
columns are the presence or absence of a specific performance clause. For this combination
of clauses, p = 0.11, significant at p< 0.001. The table's last row provides an additional

arrangements for one or more of the non-defaulting Underwriters, or any other underwriters, to purchase all,

but not less than all, of the Defaulted Securities....
Variations on this language appear in many underwriting agreements. Gulf Power Company, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1:

$45,000,000 Series E 6.00% Senior Notes Underwriting Agreement § 10,Jan. 18, 2002, filed Jan. 30, 2002, SEC File
No.: 000-02429, Accession No.: 0000044545-02-000002 (obligating nondefaulting underwriters to purchase defaulted
securities); Ford Motor Company, Form 8-K, Exh.1.1: Ford Motor Company Capital Trust II, _% Cumulative
Convertible Trust Preferred Securities (Liquidation Preference $50 per Preferred Security) [Form of Underwriting

Agreement] § 10, at 22, -, 2002, filedJan. 30, 2002, SEC File No.: 001-03950, Accession No.: 0000950124-02-000164
(obligating nondefaulting underwriters to purchase defaulted securities).
2
1 1See

sources cited in note 7 supra.

68

Eisenberg and Miller

Table 13:

Associations Among Dispute Resolution Clauses
Specific Performance

Arbitration clause

( = 0.11; p< 0.001

Jury trial waived
Specify litigation forum
Reject American Rule
Reject American Rule

(D
(D
(D
4)

= 0.15;
= 0.20;
= 0.04;
= 0.22;

Arbitration Clause

p < 0.001 D = 0.03; p=
p <0.001 (D = 0.04; p =
p = 0.070 4) = 0.06; p =
p< 0.001 (D = 0.15; p<

jury Trial Waived

0.133
0.058 (I= 0.43; p <0.001
0.008 )= 0.02; p= 0.406
0.001 4= 0.12; p<0.001

Specify Litigation
Forum

)= 0.04; p= 0.077
)= 0.13; p= <0.001

(treating underwriting
as American Rule)
Sources: Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 7, at 351 (tbl. 2); Eisenberg & Miller, The
English vs. the American Rule, supra note 7, at 352 (tbl. 2); Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value? supra note 7,
at 553 (tbl. 2); SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS databaseJan. 2002 toJune 30, 2002 for all contract types
other than mergers andJan. 2002 toJuly 31, 2002 for merger contracts.

comparison for the recharacterized treatment of the American Rule on attorney fees,
modified in the case of underwriting contracts, as described in Section V.
As described in Section V, Table 13's first column shows that the presence of specific
performance clauses is associated with rejecting the four other dispute resolution clauses,
and this relation is highly statistically significant for all combinations if the modified
American Rule coding for underwriting contracts is used. Using that modified coding, all
but two associations among clauses in the table are highly statistically significant. The single
strongest association in the table is between the presence of a litigation forum clause and
waiver ofjury trial. This is likely because parties who focus on a litigation forum likely also
focus on the adjudicator in that forum.
The exceptions are for the relation between arbitration clauses and (1) jury trial
waiver clauses and (2) litigation forum clauses. These weak associations are likely because
the presence of an arbitration clause largely moots the issues of jury trial and litigation
forum. Juries are not available in arbitration and a litigation forum is less important than
the details of the arbitration mechanism. So the patterns of significant associations between
rejection of default rules is reasonably consistent and the exceptions are readily explicable.

V1. CONCLUSION
Specific performance clauses are a rich source of contract theory, adjudicated cases, and
speculation. Prior studies have not focused on the rates of such clauses' use, much less on
the implications of the rates of use for theory. Our data provide modest endorsement of
specific performance being subordinate to the default damages rule because a majority of
contracts accept the default rule, at least if silence is read as approval. However, the data
also suggest that inferring endorsement across a broad range of contract types is unwarranted. Sufficient variation in opting into specific performance across contract types suggests that theories of contractual remedies should expressly account for contract type
variation. High rates of specific performance use in the area of corporate combinations
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through merger or asset sales, and inclusion of specific performance in at least some
contracts of every type, suggest that the real world of sophisticated corporate contracting is
more complex than can be captured by existing theories of contractual remedies.
Variation of specific performance use by contract type is in one sense consistent with
the common-law treatment of specific performance, which classically distinguished
between real estate contracts and other contracts.'' Our data do not identify real estate
transactions and the distinction is said to be fading."' Nevertheless, the modern business
acquisition, developed well after the common law's distinctive treatment of land contracts,
might be analogized to acquiring unique assets, just as each land transaction was regarded
as unique. Our data thus support, consistently with the common law, the wisdom and
efficiency of differentiating by contract type in the area of specific performance.

'E.g., Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 190 (1851) (refusing to extend specific performance to a contract relating to
timber because it differed from land).
12E.g.,

Farnsworth, supra note 56, at 746-47.

